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ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL 1: A MILITARY VIEW*
by
LT. COLONEL BURRUS M. CARNAHAN, USAF**
This paper is intended to analyze Additional Protocol I from a military
perspective. More specifically, it presents the views of a United States military
officer (albeit an officer who is also a lawyer) on the Protocol.
To begin with, the Protocol, if ratified by the United States, would be
taken seriously by our armed forces. It is United States policy to comply with
the law of war in the conduct of military operations, and this body of law is
regularly applied in American military courts.' During the war in Southeast
Asia, for example, 36 members of the U.S. Army were tried by courts-martial
for violations of the law of war.'
It should be expected, then, that if the United States were to ratify the
Protocol, that document would have a major impact on the conduct of the
armed forces in war. It is not realistic to assume that the United States could
ratify the Protocol, for whatever diplomatic and political benefits that might
entail, and that its armed forces could simply ignore any inconvenient provi-
sions of the Protocol in practice.
As compared with the earlier Geneva Conventions,' the Protocol breaks
new ground by attempting to regulate the actual conduct of combat opera-
tions. It is in these new provisions (principally Articles 48 to 60) that there are
military difficulties with the Protocol. Articles 50 and 52, for example,
establish a presumption that in case of "doubt" as to whether a person or ob-
ject is civilian, he, she, or it shall be considered to be civilian, and thus not sub-
ject to attack.
*The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views
of the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or any other agency of the United States govern-
ment.
**Maritime/United Nations Negotiation Division. J5, Office Joint Chiefs of Staff. L.L.M. University of
Michigan 1974; J.D. Northwestern University School of Law 1964; B.A. Drake University 1966.
'See Department of Defense Directive 5100.77, July 10, 1979, Subject: DOD Law of War Program; Car-
nahan, The Law of War in The United States Court of Military'Appeals. 22 A.F.L. REv. 120 11980-81t.
2G. PRUGH, LAW AT WAR: VIETNAM 1964-73 74 11975).
'Geneva Convention on the Wounded and Sick, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362
thereinafter cited as Geneva Convention on the Wounded and Sicklj Geneva Convention on the Wounded.
Sick and Shipwrecked at Sea, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363. Geneva Convention on
Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364; Geneva Convention on Civilians.
August 12, 1949, 5 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
'Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. and Relating to the Protection of the
Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, art. 50, para. I, art. 52. para. 3, 16
I.L.M. 1391 Ihereinafter cited as Protocol I1 D. SCHINDLER &J. TOMAN. THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS
551, 580, 582 (2d ed. 1981) Ihereinafter cited as SCHINDLER& TOMAN1.
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In war, however, decisions are almost never free of doubt. Commanders
must constantly make important decisions on the basis of imperfect informa-
tion of questionable reliability. Clausewitz wrote the classic description of this
problem 150 years ago:
Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false,
and most are uncertain. What one can reasonably ask of an officer is that
he should possess a standard of judgment, which he can gain only from
knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense. He should be
guided by the laws of probability. These are difficult enough to apply
when plans are drafted in an office far from the sphere of action; the task
becomes infinitely harder in the thick of fighting itself, with reports
streaming in.
Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The dif-
ficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is in-
conceivable unless one has experienced war.s
As a concrete example of the "fog of war," consider this recent descrip-
tion, by Secretary of Commerce Baldridge, of Marine combat in Okinawa in
World War II:
On the front lines, it's kill or be killed, and you have to be passable at it if
you are going to last more than a night or two.
And the longer you last, if you're going to beat the odds, the more you are
brutalized. Question: Otherwise how could you give the order to fire on a
bunch of Okinawan women looking for their dead near your lines on a
quiet night lighted by a full moon? Answer: Because you suspected they
were Japanese soldiers dressed in women's robes. Question: Did you try to
warn them off to see whether they were women and would leave?
Answer: No. Thought about it, but a warning would have given away our
location. Question: Shouldn't you have been sure before firing? Answer:
Being sure can get you killed - and they did turn out to be Japanese
soldiers, every one.6
It can hardly be said that Lt. Baldrige was free from doubt as to the
civilian status of the Japanese "women." Had he anachronistically followed
the guidance of Additional Protocol I, he would have regarded them as
civilians, not subject to attack. As he notes, however, such an approach might
have cost he and his men their own lives.
In recognition of this phenomenon, Anglo-American law has traditionally
accorded great weight to the good-faith judgments of military decision-makers,
and has usually considered such decisions to be beyond the scope of ordinary
3C. VON CLAUSEWITZ. ON WAR 117, 119 (M. Howard and P. Parer trans. 1976).
'Baldrige, An American in Japan, Wash. Post, Aug. 20, 1985, § A, at 15, col. 1.
[Vol. 19:4
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judicial review.7 The Protocol, by requiring decisions to be made a certain way
whenever "doubt" exists, virtually invites "second-guessing" of decisions
reached in the midst of combat, including judicial review of such decisions.
Another military concern with the Protocol arises from that document's
treatment of regular armed forces vis-a-vis guerrilla fighters. The law of war
has traditionally discouraged fighting, gathering information or conducting
other military operations while not in proper military uniform. Enemy person-
nel captured while engaged in sabotage or other combat operations in civilian
clothing, or while gathering military intelligence under false pretenses, have
been subject to punishment under the law of the capturing power.8 This rule is
based on the need to protect the civilians from the effects of warfare as much
as possible. If military personnel are not clearly separated from the civilian
population, it will be difficult for the enemy to accord that population full im-
munity from attack.
Guerrilla organizations, of course, often reject any effort to distinguish
themselves from the civilian population and instead try to hide from the enemy
by blending in with that population. On capture, a guerrilla practicing such
tactics would traditionally be subject to trial and punishment for violation of
the law of war. The Protocol changes this situation, however, by stating that in
certain "situations" where, "owing to the nature of the hostilities" (i.e., guer-
rilla warfare), a combatant cannot distinguish himself from the civilian popula-
tion during all military operations preparatory to an attack, such combatants
will still be entitled to prisoner of war status and treatment if they carry their
arms openly during an attack and deployments preceding the launching of an
attack.9 While relaxing the principle of distinction from the civilian population
for guerrillas, the Protocol also makes it clear that this relaxation does not ap-
ply to the regular armed forces who typically fight guerrillas: "This Article is
not intended to change the generally accepted practice of States with respect to
the wearing of the uniform by combatants assigned to the regular, uniformed
armed units of a Party to the conflict."'" The Protocol thus places the guerrilla
in a legally advantageous position, since he may lawfully use tactics that are
still forbidden to his regular forces opponent. The guerrilla's right to blend in
with the civilian population (short of deployments preceding an attack) takes
on even more importance in light of the Protocol's presumption (discussed
above) that "in case of doubt" a person must be considered to be a civilian.
The guerrilla may even have a privileged position in relation to regular
armed forces friendly to him. Traditionally, a member of the armed forces who
'See. e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 11909).
'See ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I 1942); Baxter, So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency:'Spies. Guerrillas and
Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323 (1951).
'See Protocol I supra note 4, at art. 44, para. 3.
"0Protocol I supra note 4, at art. 44, para, 7.
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engages in espionage against the enemy (i.e., gathering military information
while dressed as a civilian, or under other false pretenses) is not subject to
punishment if he is able to rejoin his own army before capture.' In trying to
adapt this rule to the needs of guerrillas, Article 46 of the Protocol provides
that a member of a guerrilla organization "who is a resident of territory oc-
cupied by an adverse Party," and who gathers military information may only
be punished as a spy if captured while actually engaging in espionage.
Members of regular armed forces must still rejoin their forces before becoming
safe from punishment as a spy.
Consider, for example, the situation of a patrol of regular forces sent into
enemy-occupied territory to cooperate with a local resistance movement. After
making contact with each other, a regular and a resistance fighter together
reconnoiter, in civilian clothing, an enemy installation. Both have committed
espionage under the law of war. However, the resistance member could not,
under the Protocol, be punished for espionage by the occupying power unless
he had been captured in the act of gathering information; the regular is still
subject to punishment if he is captured at any time before he rejoins his own
army, outside the occupied territory.
Friends of the Protocol might concede that, while Articles 44 and 46 do
appear to give the guerrilla legal privileges not enjoyed by members of regular
national armed forces, this is no more unfair than existing law, which
"discriminates" the other way, in favor of regulars. Still, these new provisions
are not calculated to endear the Protocol to members of regular, uniformed
armed forces.
The same is true of Article 56, though here the professional military reac-
tion is likely to be one of frustration rather than a feeling of discrimination. Ar-
ticle 56 prohibits attacks on certain dams, dikes, and nuclear power stations
and creates a new symbol - three orange circles in a row - to designate pro-
tected facilities.'2 Perhaps the most basic problem with Article 56 is that it is
not clear which facilities will be entitled to display this new symbol and which
will not. Dams, dikes, and nuclear power stations are protected under Article
56 only if "severe" civilian casualties might result from flooding or the release
of radioactivity. There is no internationally agreed criterion to determine if
losses are "severe," so the application of this standard will be completely sub-
jective. This uncertainty is amplified by the use of the term "may"; dams,
dikes, and nuclear power stations are protected whenever severe civilian losses
""A spy who, after rejoining the army to which he belongs, is subsequently captured by the enemy, is
treated as a prisoner of war, and incurs no responsibility for his previous acts of espionage." Regulations
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the Hague Convention IV) on Land War-
fare. October 18, 1907, art. 31, 36 SrAT. 2227, T.S. 539 Ihereinafter cited as Hague Regulations on Land
Warfarel: compare Protocol I supra note 4, at art. 46.
"
2SCHINDLER& TOMAN. supra note 4, at 583-84. The new sign is illustrated in Annex I to Protocol I supra
note 4, at article 16.
[Vol. 19:4
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from the release of dangerous forces are objectively foreseeable, rather than
whenever such effects are likely or probable. 3 Coupling the use of the term
"may" with the presumption of civilian status in Article 50 expands the poten-
tial impact of Article 56, but also expands its uncertainty in application. Com-
manders and targeting staffs would not only have to decide whether severe
losses might occur in a particular area, they must also weigh whether any
"doubt" exists as to whether the persons affected are civilians. (Aerial
photographs might show, for example, that flooding caused by a dam attack
would wipe out a system of roads heavily used by military trucks carrying
military supplies; 4 they would be unlikely to show whether the drivers, who
might suffer severe losses from drowning, are civilian or military.)
In practice, states party to the Protocol are likely to claim protection for
their own dams, dikes, and nuclear power stations whenever there is any col-
orable basis for such a claim. When carrying out combat operations against the
dams, dikes, and nuclear power stations of other parties, however, they are
likely to reject, as unfounded and even perfidious, the claims of adversaries
that their dams and dikes are subject to protection. This situation is in turn
likely to lead to charges and countercharges of violations of Article 56 and
other "war crimes," and eventually to a breakdown of respect for the law of
war on both sides, as each perceives that the other is acting in bad faith.
This element of subjective judgment is not a factor in other international
agreements establishing protective signs and symbols for armed conflict. There
is usually little doubt in the mind of an objective observer as to whether a par-
ticular building is being used solely as a hospital, and thus is entitled to display
the Red Cross or Red Crescent.'" One agreement which did establish a subjec-
tive standard, the 1 954 Hague Convention on Cultural Property, limits an at-
tacker's obligation to respect the protective symbol by the principle of military
necessity.6
There are other problems with the wording of Article 56. A nuclear power
station loses its protection if "electric power" from the station provides "regu-
lar, significant, and direct support of military operations." At the diplomatic
conference where the Protocol was drafted it was pointed out that this stan-
dard neglects the existence of modern power grids, which make it impossible to
tell whether power from a particular plant is going to a particular user.'7 Noth-
ing was done in response to this criticism, however. This standard also makes
"3See M. BOTHE, K. PARTSCH,. & W. SOLF. NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT 353 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as BOTHE. PARTSCH &SOLFI.
"The United States carried out attacks for this purpose during the Korean conflict. See R. FUTRELL. THE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN KOREA. 1950-1953, 668-69, 673 (1983).
"See Geneva Convention on the Wounded and Sick, supra note 3, at art. 42.
"bSee Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, art. 4, II
249 U.N.T.S. 240.
"BOTHE, PARTSCH.&SOLF. supra note 13, at 355.
Spring, 19861
5
Carnahan: The 1977 Geneva Protocols
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1986
AKRON LAW REVIEW
no provision for other types of military support that might be furnished by a
nuclear power plant, such as providing material for use in nuclear weapons.
For a dam or dike to lose its protection, it must not only provide "regular
significant, and direct support of military operations," but must also be "used
for other than its normal function" at the time. The placing of anti-aircraft
guns on dams or dikes is a clear example of use for other than a normal func-
tion, in direct support of military operations. However, a hydroelectric dam
providing electric power in regular, significant, and direct support of military
operations would not be subject to attack under Article 56, while a nuclear
power station providing identical support would lose its protection. Similarly,
placing anti-aircraft guns on or around a nuclear generating plant would not
cause the plant to lose its protection, while such use of a dam or dike would
cause loss of protection. There appears to be little rational basis for these
distinctions.
The preceding is certainly not an exhaustive discussion of all the military
concerns with Protocol i. It should, however, give some idea of the kinds of
practical military problems raised by many of the Protocol's provisions. In the
long run, effective implementation of such provisions in the actual conduct of
combat operations is unlikely, even if the Protocol is technically in force for
the parties to the conflict. Other parts of the Protocol, of course, do reflect
modern military practice and may already be part of the customary law of war,
or are likely to ripen into customary law. The definition of perfidy in Article
37, for example, clarifies and updates an important rule of customary law.'"
Similarly, the definition of "military objectives" in Article 52 has already been
adopted in United States military publications, even though the United States
has not ratified Protocol i, and is probably well on its way to incorporation in-
to international customary law. Finally, the rule in Article 57 on warning the
civilian population prior to an attack is already a more accurate reflection of
actual state practice than the earlier rule in Article 26 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations."
Provisions such as these will probably be regarded as accurate statements
of customary law, regardless of how many nations ultimately ratify Protocol 1,
and will make an important contribution to the codification and development
of the law of war. However, many other provisions of the Protocol are, quite
"Cf. Article 23b of the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare, supra note 1I: "it is especially forbidden ... to
kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army."
"See US AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 110-31, INTERNATIONAL LAW - THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND
AIR OPERATIONS. para. 5-3b (1976); US ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE. para.
40c (Change I, 15 July 1976).
1'"Effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless cir-
cumstances do not permit," Protocol I supra note 4, at art. 57 para. 2(c). The Hague Regulations on Land
Warfare, supra note 1I, had required warnings prior to bombardment of towns, "except in cases of assault."
For the negotiating history of this provision and its application in practice, see Carnahan, The Law of Air
Bombardment in Its Historical Context, A.F.L. REV., Summer 1975, at 39, 45-48.
[Vol. 19:4
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simply, militarily impractical. Governments that have not yet ratified or acced-
ed to the Protocol should give full consideration to the problems that it could
create for their armed forces before they decide whether to become a party to
this treaty. The formal adoption of rules of war that cannot be implemented in
practice does not, in the long run, advance the development of international
humanitarian law, and will undercut the credibility of this body of law with
the very military professionals who must apply it on the battlefield.
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